Workshop 18. 4. 2016

Workshop

Prague Spring Law and Public Policy workshops (CeLAPA)May 10-11, 2016Convenor: Axel Gosseries

“What’s wrong with discrimination?” CeLAPA Research workshop - May 10, 2016Venue: Charles University, Faculty of Law, nám. Curieových 901/7

Morning chair:Jana Ondrejko (Charles University, Faculty of Law)

10h – 11h15 - Tom Parr (Essex)The Wrongness of Discrimination: A Defence of Pluralism

Abstract: Some philosophers defend a harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, according to which we can explain the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, I offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. On this basis, I argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be exclusively outcome-focused. A more promising view must also incorporate a concern for the deliberation of the discriminator and, in particular, the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action. This result is not only philosophically interesting, it also has implications for the social and political institutions that we ought to support.

Discussant: Oscar Horta11h30-12h45 – Miklós Könczöl (Pázmány Catholic Univ./Hungarian Academy of Sciences) Proxy votes for under-age citizens: Positive or negative discrimination?

Abstract: The idea that families with children could cast additional votes at elections has been raised, once again, during the debates surrounding the drafting of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. While such solutions were never enacted, a good deal of legal and philosophical arguments have been formulated, both pro and con. My presentation first discusses rights-based arguments focusing on the discriminative character of voting age limits. Second, I turn to the broader issue of discrimination as it appeared in the Hungarian context. While age limits are arguably discriminative against under-age citizens, in the Hungarian debate the concern was raised that proxy votes cast by parents may be discriminative against non-parents on the one hand, and may lead to the over-representation of certain social groups (such as Christian or Gypsy families) on the other.

Discussant: Petr Agha

Afternoon chair: Ondrej Preuss (Charles University)(TBC)

14h15-15h30 Oscar Horta (Santiago de Compostela)Discrimination against vegans

Abstract : Discrimination against vegans has some features in common with others such as ageism and lookism, especially in that it remains mostly invisible, even if it affects a non-negligible number of people. However, discrimination against vegans has some distinctive characteristics. It is a form of discrimination whose victims are particularly well aware of. However, vegans typically choose not to fight it. This happens as it is in fact a second order discrimination resulting from discrimination against nonhuman animals, on which vegans focus. If the first order discrimination (the one against nonhuman animals) is wrong, then all instances of discrimination against vegans are wrong too. If discrimination against nonhuman animals is correct, or it is not really a form of discrimination at all, then many (though not all) forms of private discrimination against vegans can be right, but a number of instances of public discrimination against them will still be very hard t o defend.

Discussant : Axel Gosseries

15h45-17h Greg Bognar (Stockholm)Disability Discrimination in Health Care

Many philosophers, health service researchers, and disability advocates worry that people with chronic or permanent disabilities may be unfairly discriminated against in health care, even when health care resources are allocated on the basis of standard prioritization methods (like cost-effectiveness analysis). In the first part of this talk, I present and clarify the disability discrimination objection. I explain and illustrate the ways in which people with disabilities may be disadvantaged in health care resource allocation, and discuss whether the disadvantages are unfair. In the second part, I ask whether the philosophical problem applies in real life; that is, whether real-life priority setting exercises would in fact result in unfair discrimination against people with disabilities.

Discussant: Tom Parr