Legacy as one of Manifestations of Autonomy of Will in Law of Succession
Czech original: Odkaz jako jeden z projevů autonomie vůle v dědickém právu
The article deals with the legal institute of legacy from the point of view of the application of the principle of autonomy of will in the law of succession. The presentation of historical development shows that the roots of this institute can be found in Roman law, as well as in the direct link of ABGB to legal constructi ons established in antiquity. An excursion beyond the Czech legal order abroad proves that the legacy was and is a traditional institute of inheritance law, which allows the area of autonomy of the will of the testator to be extended. Further, the legacy in the current Civil Code is examined. The various aspects of the legacy that relate to the application of the will autonomy are analysed. The author concludes that without the pos sibility to establish a legacy, the autonomy of the will of the testator would not be complete and that the Civil Code opens a very wide area for the testator to various types of dispositions within the legal regulation of the legacy. Only the possibility of calling in addition to the heir (the universal successor), also a legatee, who is not responsible for the debtor’s debts, makes the application of the principle of the autonomy of will in law of succession really complex. At the same time, it is pointed out that another solution is not possible if the current concept of the Civil Code stands on anthropocentric conception of private law, that is to say, a con cept whose core motive is respect for the freedom of the individual and his wishes. Klíčová slova: law of succession, legacy, autonomy of will, development, testament, codicil Investment Court System: European Union’s Abrupt Divorce with Investment Arbitration Ondřej Svoboda Abstract: Investment dispute settlement system based on investment arbitration and known as investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) has been a subject of substantial criticism, particularly in the context of regional trade and investment negotiations. After the public consultation and interinstitutional discussions, the European Union decided in 2015 in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations with the United States, to replace ISDS in its treaties by a new approach to investment dispute settlement known as investment court system (ICS). According to the European Union the new dispute sett lement mechanism is a necessary reaction to the public’s lack of trust towards ISDS and subjects to de mocratic principles and public scrutiny. This article at first attempts to explain the transformation of EU’s position. It then focuses on three issues of ICS functioning which draw the most attention: impartiality and independency of arbitrators, predictability and consistency in decisionmaking and enforcement of awards. The overall evaluation of ICS and its positioning into broader efforts to reform international investment law are reached by analysing these issues.
Czech original: Článek se zabývá institutem odkazu z pohledu uplatnění principu autonomie vůle v dědickém právu. Výklad o historickém vývoji ukazuje kořeny tohoto institutu v římském právu, jakož i přímou návaznost
ABGB na právní konstrukce zavedené již v období starověku. Zahraniční exkurz dokazuje, že odkaz byl a je tradičním institutem dědického práva, který umožňuje rozšířit prostor pro uplatnění autonomie vůle
zůstavitele. Dále je zkoumána úprava odkazu v současném občanském zákoníku. Jsou analyzovány jednotlivé aspekty odkazu, které souvisí s uplatněním autonomie vůle. Autor dochází k závěru, že bez možnosti zřídit odkaz by autonomie vůle zůstavitele nebyla úplná a že občanský zákoník otevírá v rámci právní úpravy odkazu velmi široký prostor zůstaviteli pro další druhy dispozic. Teprve možnost povolat vedle dědice(tedy univerzálního nástupce) také odkazovníka, který neodpovídá za dluhy zůstavitele, činí uplatnění zásady autonomie vůle v dědickém právu vskutku komplexní. Zároveň je poukázáno na skutečnost, že jiné řešení ani není možné, hlásí-li se současná koncepce občanského zákoníku k antropocentrickému pojetí soukromého
práva, tj. k pojetí, jehož ústředním motivem je respekt ke svobodě jednotlivce a k jeho přáním.