The French Constitutional Council and Budgetary Discipline in the European Union
Czech original: Francouzská Ústavní rada a rozpočtová disciplína v Evropské unii
The present article analyzes the decision of 9 August 2012, in which the Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) of the French Republic rules that the ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, also known as the Fiscal Compact), signed at Brussels on 2 March 2012 by the representatives of 25 Member States of the European Union (EU), can take place without the prior amendment of the French Constitution provided that France will not constitutionalize provisions of the TSCG and will implement these provisions by means of organic laws (lois organiques). The main purpose of the TSCG is to oblige the Member States whose currency is the euro, to table their public budgets under normal circumstances exclusively as balanced or even in surplus (the so-called golden rule). In order to achieve this purpose, not only the TSCG imposes on the Member States a set of specific undertakings but it strengthens the supervision over the implementation of the golden rule as well. This supervision fully involves political institutions of the EU (in particular, the European Commission and the Council of the EU) but, as a novelty, also the Court of Justice of the EU. Under these conditions, there is no doubt the TSCG can have impact on the hardcore of the sovereignty of the Member States and the decision of the President of the French Republic to initiate ex ante review of the TSCG before the Constitutional Council was substantiated. As far as the detailed conclusions of the Constitutional Council are concerned, the author maintains that the argumentation of the Constitutional Council has been in some aspects somewhat legalistic and, overally, more forthcoming than in case of the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union itself. That can be explained especially by the current political and economic context. Nevertheless, materially, the pressing question remains to what extent it is realist and appropriate to petrify the rules pertaining to the revenues and expenditures of government – public authority.
Czech original: Předkládaný článek rozebírá rozhodnutí ze dne 9. srpna 2012, jímž Ústavní rada Francouzské republiky konstatovala, že k ratifikaci Smlouvy o stabilitě, koordinaci a správě v Hospodářské a měnové unii uzavřené v Bruselu 2. března 2012 zástupci 25 členských států EU může dojít bez předchozí změny Ústav za podmínky, že Francie nepřikročí ke konstitucionalizaci ustanovení této smlouvy a provede smlouvu běžnými zákony. Jde-li o závěry Ústavní rady, autor tvrdí, že její argumentace byla v určitých aspektech poněkud legalistická a celkově benevolentnější než historická argumentace při zavádění samotné Hospodářské a měnové unie. Navíc se ve věcné rovině nadále vnucuje otázka, nakolik je vůbec realistické a vhodné konzervovat pravidla týkající se příjmů a výdajů veřejné moci.